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1 Introduction: European Measures Promoting Maritime Safety 
Ship-source pollution is one of the major challenges of today`s shipping community.         
Both accidental spills and illegal voluntary discharge of polluting substances into the seas 
lead to considerable damage of the marine environment. Following the major accidental 
oil-spills of 1999 and 2002 in the “ERIKA” and “PRESTIGE” accidents off the French and 
Spanish coastlines, the European Union adopted a series of legislative measures to improve 
safety at sea. These were outlined in the so-called Erika 1, Erika 2 and Erika 3 packages, 
which contained inter alia a ban on single-hull oil tankers transporting heavy-fuel oil in 
European ports, the establishment of the European Maritime Safety Agency and a 
strengthening of the legislation relating to the inspection of ships by port states and 
classification societies.  
In the course of this process, also a sanctions regime for ship-source pollution offences was 
developed, and on 12 July 2005 the European Parliament and the EU Council adopted 
Directive 2005/35/EC1 “on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, 
including criminal sanctions for polluting offences”, based on Article 80(2) EC Treaty. To 
supplement the Directive, Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA2 “to strengthen the criminal 
law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution” was adopted 
in September 2005 on the basis of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.  
According to Article 1 of the said Directive, its purpose is “to incorporate international 
standards for ship-source pollution into Community law and to ensure that persons 
responsible for discharges are subject to adequate penalties.” It establishes that Member 
                                                 
1
 OJ 2005 L 255, Page 11. 
2
 OJ 2005 L 255, Page 164. 
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States have to regard ship-source pollution committed with intent or serious negligence as 
infringements, which have to “be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties, which may include criminal or administrative penalties.” 
The Framework Decision was adopted to supplement the Directive as the instrument by 
which the European Union intended to approximate criminal-law legislation of the Member 
States.3 It provided that the Member States, in order to attain the objective pursued by the 
Directive, should regard certain offences specified in the Directive as criminal offences and 
provide for criminal penalties. Furthermore, it contained detailed provisions on the nature, 
type or levels of the criminal penalties that should be applied by the Member States in case 
of ship-source pollution caused with intent or by serious negligence. 
 
Both the Directive and the Framework Decision were recently challenged before the 
European Court of Justice (hereinafter: the Court). 
The Directive was challenged by a broad coalition of the maritime shipping industry led by 
INTERTANKO and representing substantial proportions of that industry. The applicants 
were supported by the Member States Greece, Cyprus and Malta. They argued, that the 
Directive was invalid because of a conflict with the international regime for criminal 
liability for ship-source pollution which binds the Member States by MARPOL 73/78 and 
UNCLOS 1982. While MARPOL 73/78 only imposes liability for polluting offences in 
case of “intent” or “recklessness”, the Directive requires the Member States to introduce 
penalties in cases of “serious negligence.” On 3 June 2008 the Court delivered its judgment 
in this case. It ruled that the validity of the Directive cannot be assessed by reference to 
MARPOL or UNCLOS and that consequently the Directive is valid.4 
In contrast to this case, the Framework Decision was not challenged by opponents to a 
strict pollution regime inside the European Union, but by the Commission itself. The 
Commission based its appeal on competence issues, stating that the Framework Decision 
was adopted on the wrong legal basis. The Court on 23 October 20075 followed the 
Commission`s appeal and annulled the Framework Decision. It held that some provisions 
                                                 
3
 See also: Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] ECR I-09097, para 3. 
4
 Intertanko v The Secretary of State for Transport (C-308/06) [2008] ECR 000. 
5
 Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] ECR I-09097, para 3. 
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of the Framework Decision could have been validly adopted by the Community, and that 
consequently the adoption of the Framework Decision by the Council under the third pillar 
infringed on Community competences. 
 
The annulment of Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA in Case C-440/056 (Marine 
Pollution) constituted a new “milestone” in the complex process of “Europeanization” of 
criminal law and received a lot of attention. Concerning the EU`s combat against ship-
source pollution, several questions arise out of the annulment. 
First, it has to be asked how this judgment affected the sanctions regime for ship-source 
pollution offences. There has been some dissension between commentators as to the 
question, if the decision rather weakened or strengthened the EU`s legal framework on 
maritime safety. While the shipping industry viewed the decision as a blow against the 
EC`s overhasty legislative responses to the ERIKA and PRESTIGE disasters, legal scholars 
rather interpreted it as possibly strengthening the fight against ship-source pollution since 
more competences were conferred to the supranational first pillar.  
The next question is, which possibilities the EC has to act in response to the judgment in 
order to fill the legal vacuum that was created by the annulment of the Framework 
Decision. Considering the legislative competences of the Community, what would be the 
most effective means to achieve the aims pursued with the Framework Decision? Should 
the Community really stick to criminal law related measures or could other means like 
administrative sanctions be equally effective to protect the maritime environment?  
To answer these questions, it will be necessary to look at the scope of the Community`s 
competences in criminal law - how did things develop in this field before the judgment in 
Marine Pollution, what where the grounds for the annulment of the Framework Decision 
and most important, what are the implications to be drawn for the future from the decision? 
Furthermore, this paper will consider administrative sanctions as a possible alternative to 
criminal law in the Community`s efforts to promote maritime safety. The Community has 
for a long time utilized administrative sanctions as a remedy to enforce compliance with 
                                                 
6
 Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] ECR I-09097. 
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Community law. The most prominent sectors are hereby competition law7 and agriculture,8 
which will be considered in more detail below. However, concerning ship-source pollution, 
the Commission sticks to criminal law as a “necessary instrument in the fight for an 
effective enforcement of the rules on maritime safety.”9 The vindicability of this 
assumption will be questioned, especially in respect of the necessity to introduce criminal 
sanctions in the field of maritime safety. 
 
Chapter two of the thesis starts to touch briefly on the legal basis of Community acts in the 
maritime safety sector. Then, an analysis of the status of criminal law in the European 
Community follows. First, the standing of criminal law in legal systems is examined in 
general. Second, the competences of the Community in the field of criminal law are 
illustrated. Emphasis is put on the recent developments in the Europeanization of criminal 
law, especially on a landmark case of the Court in environmental matters of 1995 and on 
the recent annulment of Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA. By this, the limits of the 
Community concerning the adoption of criminal provisions in the field of maritime safety 
will be illustrated. 
Chapter three goes on to analyse which effects the annulment of Framework Decision 
2005/667/JHA has on the European fight against ship-source pollution. The annulled 
provisions are examined in detail. Further the presently pending legislative response of the 
Commission to the annulment is illustrated. The chapter moreover contains a discussion of 
some possible future implications of the annulment. 
Chapter four examines, if administrative sanctions could be an appropriate alternative to 
criminal penalties in the fight against ship-source pollution. To this end, administrative 
sanctions are first generally classified. Following, there is an overview of administrative 
sanctions in the legal system of the Community, with an emphasis on competition law and 
the agricultural sector. Thereafter, it is examined in an analogy to the sanction systems in 
the latter areas, if and to which extent these systems could be conferred to the field of 
                                                 
7
 See: Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003  L 1, page 1. 
8
 Confer: Germany v Commission (C-240/90) [1992]ECR I-5383. 
9
 EUROPA – Rapid – Press Releases: “Questions and Answers on criminal law measures against maritime 
pollution”, MEMO/08/156, 11 March 2008. 
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maritime safety. Finally, the introduction of administrative sanctions in maritime safety 
will be discussed in respect of aspects like effectiveness, the culpability of legal persons 
and the international character of the shipping industry.  
 
Finally, in the concluding fifth chapter, some arguments are set out why the introduction of 
administrative sanctions on Community level seems to be an appropriate alternative to 
criminal penalties in the field of maritime safety. 
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2 The Union`s Legislative Scope of Action 
2.1 The Union`s Legislative Scope of Action Regarding Maritime Safety 
According to Article 1 EU, the European Union marks a new stage in the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and is based on the 
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by the 
EU Treaty itself. 
There are accordingly three different pillars10 under the “roof” of the Union: The first or 
“Community pillar”, the second, which covers common foreign and security policy (Title 
V) and the third, which concerns police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Title 
VI). While the Community pillar is “supranational”,11 the second and third pillars are 
classified as “more governmental.”12 Accordingly, the measures adopted under the latter 
are more of an international law nature and lack direct effect.13  
 The founding Treaties of the European Communities conferred a range of competences to 
the Communities` institutions. As a starting point, the Community institutions have to take 
into consideration both the contents and the limitations of their competences under the EC 
Treaty every time they act. According to what is generally known as the “principle of 
attributed powers” or the principle of positive legality, the Community may only exercise 
as much power as is conferred on it by the founding Treaties.14 This principle is explicitly 
                                                 
10
 Note that the „pillars“ of the EU will be abolished if the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force. 
11
 See the judgments in: Van Gend&Loos (C-26/62) [1963] ECR 1; Costa/ENEL (C-6/64) [1964] ECR 585.   
12
 Opinion of AG Mazak in Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] ECR I-09097, paras 45, 46. 
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, Jürgen, “The European Union`s Vertical Order of Competences: The 
Current Law and Proposals for Reform”, Common Market Law Review (2002), No 39, page 232. 
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laid down in Art. 5(1) EC.15 The Community thus has no general legislative competence, 
but can only act if a particular competence is conferred on it by an enabling provision. 
These competences of the Community as such are called “vertical competences”, whereas 
the distribution of competences among the institutions is labelled “horizontal 
competences.”16     
Regarding the field of maritime safety, Article 80(2) EC Treaty empowers the Council to 
decide “whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions, may be laid 
down for sea and air transport.” The Court has interpreted this provision as conferring 
broad legislative powers upon the Community and ruled that the Community is competent 
to lay down, inter alia, “measures to improve transport safety” and “any other appropriate 
provisions” in the field of maritime transport.17  
Consequently, Directive 2005/35/EC was adopted on the legal basis of Article 80(2) EC as 
the adequate enabling norm. Since Article 80(2) EC was accepted by the Court as legal 
basis for the Directive, the question whether the Directive also could have been based on 
the Community`s competence in environmental policy according to Art.175 EC does not 
need any further examination.18 
In contrast to the Directive, Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA was adopted on basis of 
the Union`s third pillar, in particular Articles 31(1)(e) and 34(2)(b) EU. Title VI of the EU 
Treaty aims at providing citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, 
security and justice, by means of common action among the Member States in the fields in 
question, in order to prevent combat and crime. This is to be achieved, inter alia, through 
the approximation of national rules on criminal matters.19 One of the tools created for these 
purposes is the framework decision, which promotes the approximation of national 
statutory and regulatory provisions.20 Like directives under the first pillar, framework 
decisions are according to Article 34 EU binding as to the result to be achieved, leaving to 
                                                 
15
 Article 5 EC states: „The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.“  
16
 Von Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, Jürgen, supra, note 14, page 235. 
17
 Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] ECR I-9097, para 58. 
18
 Regarding this question see: AG Mazak, supra, note 12, paras 126-129. 
19
 Article 29 EU. 
20
 Opinion of AG Colomer in Commission v Council (C-176/03) [2005] ECR I-7879. 
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the national authorities the choice of form and methods. But, unlike directives, they never 
have direct effect. 
According to the foregoing, the Directive 2005/35/EC to combat ship-source pollution via 
the introduction of sanctions was adopted under the “supranational” first pillar, but the 
framework decision designed to supplement this Directive was adopted under the “more 
intergovernmental” third pillar only. This splitting between Community and 
intergovernmental competence via a so – called “double-text” mechanism was in the past 
applied several times due to the limits of the legislative competences of the Community.21  
 
2.2 Criminal Law in the European Community  
2.2.1 Classification of Criminal Sanctions in Legal Systems 
Criminal law as such is supposed to sustain peaceful coexistence by ensuring law and order 
in legal systems and to protect both the society and the individual against substantive 
breaches. In doing so, criminal law avails itself of the authority`s fiercest means, namely 
the public imposition of penalties. Criminal penalties constitute the authority`s strongest 
interference with the individual`s rights and are therefore often classified as the “ultima 
ratio” in the range of legal instruments.22 So, being the “last resort” of public force, 
criminal sanctions shall only be imposed, if the sanctioned behaviour is not only prohibited, 
but especially harmful to society and its prevention therefore deemed particularly 
important.23 
The means that are available to criminal law to achieve its aims are the official disapproval 
of certain acts and the imposition of penalties.24 Criminal sanctions can be imprisonment, 
the imposition of fines or the infliction of other disadvantages on the wrongdoer. 
It is widely acknowledged that criminal sanctions are distinguished from other punitive 
measures of the authority by a distinct “ethical dimension” of criminal law. This ethical 
                                                 
21
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implications of 
the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C 176/03 Commission v Council), COM (2005) 583 final.    
22
 Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich, “Lehrbuch des Strafrechts – Allgemeiner Teil“, page 3. 
23
 Appel, Ivo, “Verfassung und Strafe“, page 23. 
24
 Ibid., at page 20. 
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dimension is said to be embodied in a moral disapproval by society of the wrongdoer`s 
acts.25 Criminal sanctions implicate this moral disapproval, thereby stigmatizing the 
wrongdoer in public, which is supposed to constitute a distinct evil for him.  
 
As to the aims of criminal law, it is widely agreed on, that the primary purpose of criminal 
sanctions is to re-establish law and order and to avoid future breaches. According to the 
European Court of Human Rights “the aims of prevention and reparation are consistent 
with a punitive purpose.”26 
Reparation hereby means that a breach is compensated by the imposition of a proportionate 
punishment, which expresses public disapproval of the sanctioned behaviour and thereby 
reassures the existing legal order.27 
Prevention is above all supposed to be achieved by the dissuasive or deterrent nature28 of 
criminal law. First, the sanctioned wrongdoer shall be kept from committing further 
breaches by the memory of the disadvantages he suffered. Second, every member of the 
legal system shall be deterred from committing criminal offences by the fear of sanctions.  
In addition, it is often stated that criminal law as a legal system`s “last resort” embodies the 
social standards underlying that system, and is therefore closely related to the identity of 
that particular community.29 
 
2.2.2 Community Competence in Criminal Law 
The law of the European Community and the criminal law of the Member States have for a 
long period existed alongside each other, without considerable contact points. This is due to 
the fact, that there was no conferment of powers on the Community in this field when the 
founding Treaties were signed.30 In fact, the EC Treaty only expressly refers to criminal 
                                                 
25
 Heitzer, Anne, “Punitive Sanktionen im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht“, 1997, page 10. 
26
 Cf. Welch v United Kingdom (1995) ECHR A307-A. 
27
 Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich, supra, note 22, page 11. 
28
 Cf. AG Mazak, supra, note 12, para 71. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Tiedemann, Klaus, „Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Strafrecht“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
(1993), No 1, page 23. 
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law to preclude a Community criminal competence in certain areas, like e.g. customs 
cooperation.31  Criminal law has traditionally been considered to be at the core of national 
State sovereignty32 and it is consequently widely acknowledged, that the Community has 
no competence in criminal law. Accordingly, the ECJ has several times set out in it`s case 
law, that “as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall 
within the Community`s competence.”33 
The lack of a Community competence in criminal law regards both the “jurisdiction to 
prescribe” and the “jurisdiction to enforce”.34 This means, the Community can in principle 
neither adopt provisions on criminal offences, nor can it`s organs impose criminal 
sanctions.  
However, this does not mean, that criminal matters are “the exclusive preserve” or 
“domaine réservé” of State sovereignty. 
First, Community law requires that the Member States protect Community interests in the 
same way as national interests. In the so-called Greek Maize – scandal the Court held, that 
infringements of Community law must be penalized under conditions, both procedural and 
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a 
similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. Moreover, the national authorities must proceed with respect 
to infringements of Community law, with the same diligence as that which they bring to 
bear in implementing corresponding national laws.35    
Second, Community law affects national criminal law in a negative dimension:  The 
Member States must not create criminal offences that contradict Community law, such as 
e.g. the principle of proportionality or the fundamental freedoms.36 In this case, convictions 
                                                 
31
 Article 135 EC. 
32
 Miettinen, Samuli, “Constitutional limits of European Community criminal law”, Montreal 2007, 
http://www.edgehill.ac.uk/law/Profiles/SMiettinenPro.htm [Visited 10 August 2008], page 2. 
33
 See: Casati (C-203/80) [1981]ECR 2595, para 27; Lemmens (C-226/97)[1998]ECR I-03711, para 19; 
Commission v Council (C-  176/03) [2005]ECR I-7879, para 47; Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007] 
ECR I-9097, para 66. 
34
 Tiedemann, Klaus, supra, note 30, page 24. 
35
  Commission v Greece (C-68/88) [1989]ECR 2965, paras 24, 25. 
36
 Tiedemann, Klaus, supra, note 30, page 25. 
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on grounds of such provisions are themselves incompatible with Community law, and 
Community law can require the repeal of these national laws. 
Third, the Community has during the last years adopted several directives, which contained 
a duty of the Member States to ensure compliance with the Community rules by the 
imposition of sanctions. These directives concerned mostly white-collar criminality, such 
as money laundering, insider-trading or import/export of dangerous waste materials.37 
However, due to the Community`s lack of criminal competence, these Directives could not 
contain the order to impose criminal sanctions. The decision, if the sanctions regime should 
be of a civil, administrative or criminal law nature therefore rested with the Member 
States.38 A duty to impose criminal penalties could only arise out of the reasoning in 
Greek-Maize, if the Member States had decided to introduce criminal penalties for 
protection of a comparable national law. Moreover, regarding the effect of these directives 
it should be borne in mind, that Community rules can generally only be enforced against 
Member States, not individuals. When a Member State fails to implement a directive, the 
Commission can initiate an infringement procedure according to Art. 226 EC against this 
State. As neither infringement proceedings nor any other remedies for non-compliance with 
Community directives can be applied to individuals, they can only be affected by the 
punitive aspects of Community criminal law, if Member States fulfil their duty to 
implement directives into their national legal systems.39 
Thus, while the Community has no competence to adopt criminal law provisions on its 
own, it is widely acknowledged that the EC can restrict the Member States in their criminal 
law legislation and also instruct them to sanction certain acts in their legal systems.40  
Criminal law is thereby clearly a part of the European integration process, even if a 
restricted one. 
 
                                                 
37
 Dannecker, Gerhard, „Strafrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft“, Juristenzeitung (1996) No 18, page 
870. 
38
 Pohl, Tobias, „Verfassungsvertrag durch Richterspruch – Die Entscheidung des EuGH zu Kompetenzen 
der Gemeinschaft im Umweltstrafrecht“, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, (2006) No 5, 
page 213. 
39
 Miettinen, Samuli, supra, note 32, page 14. 
40
 Dannecker, Gerhard, supra, note 37, page 873. 
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2.2.3 Recent Developments Regarding the “Europeanization in Criminal Law” 
The status of Community competences in criminal law as described above was notably 
affected by two recent judgments of the ECJ, which received a considerable amount of 
attention both from legal scholars and the European institutions themselves. In Commission 
v Council (C-176/03)41(Environmental Legislation), the Court ruled that although criminal 
law as such is no Community policy, the Community has the implied power to harmonise 
criminal laws of the Member States in relation to the protection of the environment. 
Following this judgment, the Court in Marine Pollution42 regarding the annulment of the 
Framework Decision on ship-source pollution, affirmed its ruling in Environmental 
Legislation, thereby showing that it would stick to the new course. Moreover, it extended 
the Community`s power to harmonise criminal laws to legal acts which were not based on 
the Community`s competences in environmental policy according to Art.174, 175 EC. 
In both cases, the Court annulled Framework Decisions regulating criminal law related 
measures on grounds of an infringement of the Community`s competences. In the eyes of 
the Court Article 47 EU, according to which none of the provisions of the EC Treaty is to 
be affected by a provision of the EU Treaty, establishes the primacy of EC law over EU 
law. According to its case law it is therefore “the task of the Court to ensure that acts 
which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.”43 
In other words, if the EC Treaty confers a competence on the Community, the Union`s 
institutions are in this area banned from acting under the second or third pillar. Both cases 
did consequently not concern the question, if the Union as such had the competence to 
regulate, but the delimitation of competences between the first and third pillar. 
                                                 
41
 Commission v Council (C-176/03)[2005] ECR I-7879. 
42
 Commission v Council (C-440/05) [2007]ECR I-9097. 
43
 Commission v Council (C-170/96) [1998]ECR I-7879, para 39; however, it was criticized by commentators 
that the Court failed to give a reason for the primacy of EC law, confer e.g. Emmans, Anna-Maria, “Die 
strafrechtliche Annexkompetenz der EG umfasst nicht Art und Mass der einzuführenden Kriminalstrafen – 
sie besteht aber auch jenseits des Umweltrechts, European Law Reporter (2008) No 3, page 103; Pohl, 
Tobias, supra, note 38, page 217. 
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For this reason commentators also advance the view, that the issue of a Community 
criminal competence primarily concerns the horizontal division of competences in the 
Union rather than the criminal liability of individuals.44 
 
2.2.3.1 The Judgment in Environmental Legislation (C-176/03) 
The proceedings in Environmental Legislation dealt with the validity of Framework 
Decision 2003/80/JHA “on the protection of the environment through criminal law”. The 
Framework Decision required the Member States to prescribe criminal penalties in respect 
of certain environmental offences. The Commission argued that both the purpose and 
content of the Framework Decision were within the scope of the Community`s powers in 
environmental policy. The Court followed this opinion and found that provisions of the 
Framework Decision could have been validly adopted under the Community`s competence 
in environmental matters as laid down in Art. 175 EC. 
The Court recalled its former case law by stating that “as a general rule, neither criminal 
law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community`s competence.”45 
However, this should not prevent “the Community legislature, when the application of 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national 
authorities is an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences from 
taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers 
necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection 
are fully effective.”46 
According to this ruling there is only one requirement to be met for the Community to 
require the Member States to introduce criminal sanctions: The imposition of criminal 
penalties must prove itself “necessary” to ensure full effectiveness of the Community rules. 
The judgment however fails to give further criteria, how to establish this “necessity” of 
criminal sanctions and the Opinion of AG Colomer is not helpful on this issue. He only 
                                                 
44
 Confer e.g. Miettinen, Samuli, supra, note 32, page 1.  
45
 Confer, supra, note 33.  
46
 Commission v Council (C-176/03) [2005] ECR I-7879, para 48. 
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points to the importance and fragility of environmental interests and states that criminal law 
is the only “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” response to environmental offences.47  
The statements which the Court made in Environmental Legislation were interpreted in 
different ways.  
The Commission issued a communication48 and the European Parliament issued a 
resolution49 in response to the judgment, in which both institutions elaborate on the effects 
of the judgment. Both institutions interpret the judgment broadly and think, that the Court`s 
reasoning is not limited to the protection of the environment. Instead, it shall be applicable 
to any sector under the first pillar, where the Community deems it necessary to ensure 
effectiveness of Community law provisions by criminal law measures.50 
In contrast to this understanding of the judgment, the Council and the Member States have 
interpreted the judgment more narrow, meaning that it should be understood as relating 
only to the field of environmental policies.51 Following this opinion, the Community`s 
competence to require the Member States to impose “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties” would be restricted to the protection of the environment 
only. 
 
It should moreover be noted, that Advocate General Colomer in his opinion delivered in 
Environmental Legislation  touched upon the question of the extent of the penalties that are 
to be applied by the Member States. 
In this regard, he stated that “no one is in a better position to assess the feasibility, 
appropriateness and effectiveness of a punitive response than the national legislating 
authorities.”52 However, the Court did not address the issue, whose responsibility it should 
be to determine the type and level of penalties in its judgment. 
                                                 
47
 Opinion of AG Colomer in Commission v Council (C-176/03)[2005]ECR I-7879, paras 75, 86. 
48
 Communication from the Commission, supra, note 21. 
49
 European Parliament resolution on the follow-up to Parlaiment`s opinion on environmental protection: 
combating crime, criminal offences and penalties, B6-0544/2006. 
50
 Communication from the Commission, supra, note 21, para 8. 
51
 AG Mazak, supra, note 12, paras 7, 37. 
52
 AG Colomer, supra, note 20, para 48. 
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Though it is without any legal effect, it should be mentioned, that the judgment was widely 
criticized by legal scholars and practitioners. The first point of criticism was that the 
criterion of “necessity” is no real requirement, but only a pseudo-requirement.53 According 
to the Court`s ruling, criminal sanctions are necessary when the Community considers them 
necessary. The necessity of a measure is consequently only dependent on the Community`s 
discretion, which makes a review on ground of objective criteria impossible. Moreover, the 
decision was criticized for anticipating the Treaty of Lisbon.54 Article 83(2) of the Treaty 
of Lisbon establishes a legislative competence of the Community in criminal law as the 
Court founded by its judgement.     
 
2.2.3.2 The Judgment in Marine Pollution    
Following the judgment in Environmental Legislation, the Commission issued a list of the 
acts adopted and pending proposals which it deemed to be affected by the judgment and 
which it deemed to require amendment.55 The only case where the Commission had the 
possibility to introduce an appeal for annulment within the procedural deadlines was the 
appeal to the Court for annulment of the Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA. The 
appeal led to proceedings that were quite parallel to those in Environmental Legislation and 
as seen above, the Court annulled Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA because some of its 
provisions could have been validly adopted under the first instead of the third pillar. 
With the ruling in Marine Pollution the Court affirmed its judgement in Environmental 
Legislation and moreover it at least partly addressed and cleared the issues that were raised 
by this former judgment. Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA contained provisions that 
requested the Member States to regard certain offences regarding ship-source pollution as 
criminal offences. Moreover, it contained detailed provisions on the type and level of the 
penalties that should be adopted by the Member States in case of an infringement. These 
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provisions should provide for an approximation of sanction levels for the same kind of 
offences in the different Member States.  
The Court found that the provisions of the Framework Decision which requested the 
Member States to impose criminal sanctions for certain offences could have been validly 
adopted by the Community. What distinguishes Marine Pollution from Environmental 
Legislation hereby is, that the legal basis in the EC Treaty to adopt those provisions was 
not held to be Art. 175 EC but Art. 80(2) EC. Directive 2005/35/EC is based on Art. 80(2) 
EC, which gives the Community the power to regulate in air and sea transport. 
The Court in this regard stated, that the Community legislature has broad legislative powers 
under Article 80(2) inter alia regarding “measures to improve transport safety” and “any 
other appropriate provisions”56 in the field of maritime transport. It found that the main 
purpose of the Framework Decision was the promotion of maritime safety and that it 
therefore belonged to the range of legislative measures that could be validly adopted under 
Art.80(2) EC. 
Then the Court went on to renew its central statement in Environmental Legislation, 
namely that “when the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating 
serious environmental offences, the Community legislature may require the Member States 
to introduce such penalties in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down in that field 
are fully effective.”57 
By this ruling, the Court regrettably failed to give clear guidance on the question, if the 
Community is only competent to provide for criminal provisions in environmental policies 
or if this competence also exists in other sectors, if this is “necessary” to ensure 
effectiveness of the Community rules.  
Advocate General Mazak addressed the issue in his opinion on the case. He stated that the 
reason for the existence of the Community`s power to require the Member States to use the 
tool of criminal enforcement was the “general principle of effectiveness underlying 
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Community law”. He concluded, that this power therefore ”must in principle also exist in 
relation to any other Community policy area, such as transport.”58 
The judgment however did not give a clear response to his opinions. On one side, it was 
held that regarding ship-source pollution the provisions providing for criminal penalties 
could be based on the Community`s competence in the transport sector. On the other side 
the Court referred to the protection of the environment several times, pointed to the 
“horizontal character” of this Community objective and stressed the fact that the 
Framework Decision aimed at improving protection of the marine environment. 
What can be said is, that the Court in any case did not affirm a general transferability of the 
judgment in Environmental Legislation to other Community competences on ground of 
effectiveness.59 However, the judgment at least widened the Community`s criminal 
competences in so far as  the power to require the Member States to impose criminal 
sanctions can be transferred to other sectors than the environmental policy, if the measures 
in question also aim at the “horizontal” matter of protection of the environment, which 
according to Art. 6 EC has to be integrated into all Community policies. 
Accordingly, most commentators do not believe that the Court in future is going to restrict 
the Community`s power to harmonise criminal laws to the protection of the environment, 
but that it will be extended to other Treaty objectives like e.g. the fundamental freedoms.60  
 
The other important aspect of the judgment in Marine Pollution regards the specification of 
sanctions that should be imposed by the Member States to penalize the infringements laid 
down in the Directive. Whereas the Court widened the Community`s power to provide 
criminal law provisions, it drew a clear line of the Community`s competences regarding the 
sanctions.  
In the judgment it simply states without further reasoning, that “the determination of the 
type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the Community`s 
sphere of competence.”61 
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The Court thereby follows the line that was already set out by AG Colomer in his opinion 
in Environmental Legislation, which was neither affirmed nor rejected by the Court 
because it did not address this issue in the former decision. AG Mazak62 agreed with AG 
Colomer and provided some further reasoning, why the specification of penalties should lie 
with the Member States. He pointed out that each Member State`s criminal code reflects a 
particular ranking of the legal interests which it seeks to protect. Further he followed the 
UK government`s argument, that a given level of fine can send out very different messages 
in different Member States regarding the seriousness of the offence in question.  
The Framework Decision was annulled in its entirety, since the Court regarded it to be 
indivisible. 
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3  Effects of the Judgment in Marine Pollution 
3.1 Provisions of Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA – Content and Grounds   
for Annulment 
The provisions of the annulled Framework Decision can be largely divided into three 
groups. 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 required the Member States to apply criminal penalties to certain forms 
of conduct. According to Article 2, the infringements laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of 
Directive 2005/35/EC should be regarded as criminal offences by the Member States. 
Article 3 established that also aiding, abetting or inciting such an offence should be 
criminally punishable. And Article 5 concerned the liability of legal person for those 
offences. The Court held that these Articles could have been validly adopted by the 
Community on the basis of Article 80(2) EC. 
Articles 4 and 6 contained detailed provisions as to the type and level of penalties that 
should be applied by the Member States for those offences. Article 4 dealt with penalties 
for natural person and set up time frames for the length of custodial penalties. For example, 
an intentionally committed offence as referred to in Article 2, that caused significant 
damage to the marine environment and the death or serious injury of persons should be 
punished by a “maximum of at least between five and ten years of imprisonment.” Article 6 
concerned penalties against legal persons and contained specifications as to the amounts of 
fines that should be applied, e.g. in the most serious cases a maximum of at least between 
750 000 and 1 500 000 Euro. Regarding these provisions, the Court held that the 
determination of the type and level of criminal penalties does not fall within the 
Community`s competence, so that they could not have been validly adopted under the first 
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pillar. However, since these Articles make references to Articles 2, 3 and 5 they were 
considered to be inextricably linked to those provisions. Being indivisible from those 
provisions, Articles 4 and 6 also had to be annulled.  
Articles 7, 8 and 9 concerned the establishment and co-ordination of jurisdiction, a 
mechanism for the exchange of information on the commission of criminal offences and 
the establishment of contact points to that end. Articles 10, 11, 12 respectively concerned 
territorial scope of application of the Framework Decision, the implementation obligation 
on Member States and the date of entry into force of the Framework Decision. The Court 
did not elaborate on the question, if these provisions could have been validly adopted under 
the first pillar, since it established that they were in any case inextricably linked with the 
other provisions of the Framework Decision. However, it is possible to find more guidance 
on this in AG Mazak`s opinion, who found that at least Articles 7, 8 and 9 were outside the 
Community`s competence to criminalise certain conduct. 
 
After the annulment of the Framework Decision in Marine Pollution, the contents of these 
provisions were naturally lost as a part of the EU`s legislative package to promote marine 
safety. To fill this “legal vacuum” the Commission in March 2008 released a proposal for 
an amending Directive 2005/35/EC. According to recital one of the proposal`s preamble, it 
is the purpose of the amending Directive to “approximate the definition of ship-source 
pollution offences committed by natural or legal persons, the scope of their liability and the 
criminal nature of penalties that can be imposed for such criminal offences by natural 
persons”. 
The new proposal amends Directive 2005/35/EC without changing its substance, by 
incorporating in the directive those provisions of the annulled Framework Decision, which 
prescribed that ship-source pollution committed with intent, recklessly or with serious 
negligence should be considered a criminal offence.63 There are thus no substantial 
amendments to the offences originally created by the “double-text mechanism” or to the 
levels of culpability necessary to commit an offence under the Directive. 
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Articles 4, 6 and 7 to 12 however did, due to the limits of the Community`s legislative 
powers as confined by the Court in its judgment, not find their way into the amending 
Directive. There were also no efforts from the Council to re-establish these provisions in a 
new, separate Framework provision. Consequently, regarding the content of these 
provisions, the Commission did not manage to fill the legal vacuum. 
 
3.2  Possible and Actual Effects of Amending Directive 2005/35/EC on the 
Combat against Ship-Source Pollution 
In case of adoption of the proposal for the amending directive, those provisions of the 
Framework Decision, which required the Member States to impose criminal penalties will 
be removed from the more governmental third pillar to the supranational first pillar.  
One is here not dealing with a purely technical matter concerning only the horizontal 
division of competences in the Union; in fact this deferral would entail some far-reaching 
consequences.  In contrast to Community provisions, Framework Decisions have no direct 
effect,64 a failure to transpose them cannot be overcome by an action for infringement as 
provided for in Art. 226 EC, and the Court`s jurisdiction to give rulings on the validity and 
interpretation of Union legal instruments according to Art. 35 EU is not compulsory, since 
this jurisdiction is subject to acceptance by the Member States.65 Hence, the means to 
ensure compliance with acts adopted under the first pillar are much more effective than 
under the third pillar. These limits to the effects of Framework Decisions result in a weaker 
independent legal standing of acts adopted under the third pillar compared to acts adopted 
under the first pillar. 
Consequently, the annulment of the Framework Decision will, in case of the adoption of 
the amending Directive, bring about a strengthening of the Union`s legal framework to 
promote maritime safety with regard to the criminalization of ship-source pollution. 
However, it should be remembered that the adoption of the amending Directive requires a 
qualified majority of the Member States represented in the Council according to its legal 
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basis, Article 80(2) EC. Although the provisions were adopted unanimously by the Council 
in the Framework Decision, this does not automatically mean that there will be a qualified 
majority voting for the same provisions in the Directive. The Member States are 
traditionally suspicious when it comes to transferring competences in criminal law as a 
“core area” of national sovereignty to the Community.66  This assumption was just recently 
affirmed by the fact that Member States like Greece, Cyprus and Malta supported the 
applicants in “Intertanko” in their fierce resistance against Directive 2005/35/EC. It is 
therefore hardly imaginable that these Member States would agree to the stipulation of 
criminal liability under the Directive itself. So, even if the Commission succeeded in 
widening the Community`s competences, regarding the fight against ship-source pollution, 
this might have been a Pyrrhic victory.67  
 
3.3 Possible and Actual Effects of the Waiver of an Approximation of Sanction 
Levels on the Combat against Ship-Source Pollution 
Articles 4 and 6 of Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA contained detailed provisions as to 
type and level of penalties and were aiming at the approximation of sanction levels 
regarding ship-source pollution in the Member States. Due to the Court denying a 
Community competence to rule on “type and level” of penalties, these provisions can not 
be included in the amending directive. And since there was also no new legislative action 
on Union level, the legal vacuum created here will persist for an indefinite period of time. 
The Commission acknowledges that different sanction levels in the Member States bring 
about the risk to provide for safe havens for offenders. However, it considers its hands 
bound by the Court`s judgment. Concerning its future actions in this area, the Commission 
therefore only states that it ”continues to believe that the approximation of sanction levels 
is an important issue and [that it] will reconsider the possibility and need for a legislative 
proposal in due course.”68 
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Taking into consideration the international character of the shipping industry, it is quite 
difficult to understand this laid-back attitude of the Commission. Considerably differing 
sanction levels in the Member States undoubtedly contravene the Directive`s aim of 
protection of the environment. 
Thinking about illegal voluntary discharges, polluters are given the possibility to choose to 
discharge oil or other harmful substances in the waters of Member States which have lower 
sanction levels than neighbouring Member States. However, discharges do of course not 
only affect the State in whose waters the discharge occurs. Polluting substances in the seas 
spread and consequently also affect States which would like to protect their seas by the 
dissuasive effect of higher sanction levels. Their efforts could be “sabotaged” by the laxer 
attitude of other States. Yet, if a polluting act that affects several Member States is 
substantial enough to be discovered quickly and can be traced back to the producer, several 
States could claim criminal jurisdiction, respectively applying a different system of 
sanctions. Situations like these are likely to cause legal uncertainty as to the criminal 
consequences of the very same actions. 
These effects become even more severe in the case of accidents caused by serious 
negligence. As seen above, Directive 2005/35/EC requires the Member States to regard 
polluting offences caused by “serious negligence” as criminal offences, in contrast to the 
standard of “recklessness” as laid down in MARPOL 73/78. Major shipping nations like 
Greece, Cyprus and Malta supported the applicants in Intertanko and strongly contradicted 
the “serious negligence” approach because they fear it will lead to a criminalizing of 
innocent mistakes.69 Greek commentators even perceive the “sword of Damocles hanging 
over the oceans” for private persons involved in the shipping industry.70 In opposition to 
this, several other Member States like Spain or Sweden, opposed to the application of the 
industry coalition in Intertanko. With this background, it is easy to foresee, that a free 
choice of penal sanctions will lead to considerably differing sanction levels when it comes 
to offences committed with serious negligence. One does not need visionary abilities to 
                                                 
69
 http://www.intertanko.com/upload/ECJ%20judgment%20-%20briefing%20note%20FINAL.pdf [visited on 
August 13, 2008]. 
70
 Christodoulou-Varotsi, Illiana, “Recent Developments in the EC Legal Framework on Ship-Source 
Pollution: The Ambivalence of the EC`s Penal Approach”, Transportation Law Journal (2007) No 6, page 
381.  
 24
foresee, that sanction levels in Greece, Cyprus and Malta will probably be considerably 
lower than in other Member States. These Member States of course make their ports more 
interesting for the shipping industry, which in turn could have a negative effect on the 
establishment of an internal market. 
Hence, the waiver of an approximation of sanction levels will probably have considerable 
practical effects on the European combat against ship-source pollution. 
 
3.4 Preliminary Conclusions to be Drawn from the Annulment of Framework 
Decision 2005/667/JHA 
The Community is, according to the Commission in the field of maritime safety turning to 
the criminal law as a “necessary instrument for an effective enforcement of the rules.”71 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), to 
which all EU Member States are parties and thereby bound to adhere to its provisions, 
stipulates in Article 4(4) that penalties must be “adequate in severity to discourage” 
potential polluters. Referring to this provision, the Commission holds the opinion that “the 
deterrent effect of the system of sanctions must be reinforced, sending a strong signal, with 
a much greater dissuasive effect, to potential offenders.”72 This view is also set out in the 
explanatory memorandum to the amending directive, which moreover states that “criminal 
investigation and prosecution and judicial cooperation between Member States can be 
essential and more powerful than administrative action.”73 The Commission thereby 
follows the reasoning that was already set out by Advocate Colomer in his opinion in 
Environmental Legislation, who stated that criminal law would constitute the only 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive response to conduct seriously affecting the 
environment.74 However, neither the Commission nor AG Colomer give distinct reasons 
why they consider criminal law being the only effective means to protect the environment. 
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Hence, with this starting point, the Community restricts itself in the protection of the 
maritime environment to the narrow and quite unclear limits of its competences in criminal 
matters. 
Even, if one theoretically agrees with the Commission that criminal law is the most 
effective means to avoid undesirable behaviour, one must still take into consideration the 
factual circumstances in each case. 
As could be seen above, it is still not really clear, if the necessary qualified majority of 
Member States represented in the Council will consent to the amending directive. 
Moreover, the approximation of sanction levels is by no means a negligible matter and 
should not be left disregarded for a longer period. 
If the Commission considers itself bound by the ECJ`s judgment concerning the types and 
levels of criminal penalties, it should start to think about alternative means to achieve an 
effective protection of the environment. Article 8 of Directive 2005/35/EC states that 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that infringements are subject to 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which may include criminal or 
administrative penalties. Thus, in the present situation it practically suggests itself to turn to 
the means of administrative sanctions. Sadly, the Commission simply condemned this 
possibility as “less powerful” than criminal investigation and prosecution.75 However, it 
can be strongly doubted, if the imposition of criminal penalties as such is automatically 
more powerful, as long as the decision on sanction levels is left to the single Member 
States. 
In the following, it will therefore be examined if administrative sanctions could be as 
effective or even more effective to protect the environment than criminal penalties and how 
they could be legally construed. 
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4 Administrative Sanctions in the Combat against Ship-Source Pollution 
4.1 Classification of Administrative Sanctions in Legal Systems 
Legal systems use sanctions in situations in which individuals do not adhere to their public 
duties, although these are laid down in laws or have been stipulated bindingly in the course 
of application of the law.76 The term “sanction” is in legal theory defined as every legal 
disadvantage, which is imposed on a person who has infringed upon a legal provision.77 
However, this definition does not give any guidance, whether a sanction belongs to the 
civil, criminal or public law sphere. Formally, administrative sanctions are sanctions which 
are prosecuted and imposed by administrative authorities and which contain all 
consequences that are inflicted on individuals if they disregard administrative duties.78 The 
Member States of the European Union have shaped their systems of administrative 
sanctions in different ways.79 Some States80 have special codifications for administrative 
sanctions, which regulate the imposition of such sanctions in detail; others simply know the 
concept of sanctions which are imposed by administrative authorities.81 
The distinctive criteria of administrative sanctions can be shown best by a comparison to 
criminal sanctions, even if it is not always easy to draw the demarcation line between these 
legal instruments. 
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Generally, sanctions can fulfil three different functions: Prevention, reparation and 
suppression.82 Prevention aims at the hindrance of further breaches through deterrence. 
Reparation seeks to undo the harm inflicted on the legally protected interest. Suppression 
aims at avengement of the wrong done by the infliction of a personal legal or economic 
disadvantage.83    
 Administrative sanctions are applied by authorities of the Member States to fulfil all these 
functions.84 However, while criminal law places emphasis on the repressive function, the 
primary function of administrative sanctions is said to be preventive; this means they are 
above all applied to maintain the functioning of administrative action, to terminate a 
current unlawful state or to prevent certain events in the future.85 
Apart from the slightly different function, it is commonly stated that the most important 
difference between criminal and administrative law is the “ethical dimension”.86 While 
criminal sanctions contain a social disapproval and stigmatise the wrongdoer, 
administrative sanctions do not aim at labelling the wrongdoer as a “criminal”.87 It is 
therefore often stated, that administrative sanctions are to be considered as morally neutral 
measures.88 
However, not all administrative sanctions can be regarded the same, in fact, measures 
adopted under this label can be of a considerably different character. Broadly speaking, 
administrative sanctions can be divided into two categories: sanctions with a purely 
remedial or compensatory character and sanctions with a punitive character.89 
Sanctions with a purely compensatory character consist e.g. in the reclaim of benefits 
which were wrongly obtained, the subsequent invoice of duties not paid or the charge of 
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interest on duties, which have to be paid.90 The addressee of such measures does not suffer 
from a disadvantage that goes beyond his original legal duties, as these kinds of sanctions 
are to be assessed exactly according to the loss to be recovered.  There is no infliction of a 
personal legal or economic disadvantage, which means that the authorities do not pursue 
any suppressive aim by applying such measures. 
Punitive sanctions however go beyond these measures. They consist mostly in the 
imposition of fines,91 but can also consist in the enhancement of a due amount, the 
withdrawal of a licence, the ban from a profession92 or the forfeiture of deposits.93 As a 
consequence to the loss which the wrongdoer has caused to others or the public a personal 
disadvantage is inflicted on him. Consequently, what distinguishes punitive from 
compensatory sanctions is that they contain a suppressive and deterrent function,94 they are 
in fact penalties.  
This essay will not touch upon the much discussed question, if it is at all admissible to 
impose penalties in the form of administrative sanctions and if, or to which extent 
administrative sanctions are consciously used to enhance a decriminalisation in certain 
areas. For the purpose of this essay it is sufficient to assert, that even if sanctions have a 
penal character, they can still be classified as administrative penalties. It is decisive, that 
they are imposed by administrative authorities, in contrast to criminal penalties, which can 
only be imposed by a judge. 
However, due to the penal character of these sanctions the question arises, if and to what 
extent fundamental criminal law guarantees have to be applied. The constitutional courts of 
Germany, France and Spain have all acknowledged that administrative authorities have to 
adhere to classical criminal law guarantees like e.g. the principle of legality (nulla poena 
sine lege) when imposing sanctions with a penal character.95  Accordingly, under the 
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codifications for administrative sanctions in Germany, Italy and Portugal, criminal law 
guarantees are for the most part applicable like in criminal law itself.96 
Even more important, from a more international perspective, this position has also been 
confirmed by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  Article 6 of 
the European Rights Convention provides for additional and more extensive procedural and 
substantive guarantees with regard to criminal cases as compared with civil cases. In its 
widely known cases Engel v Netherlands97 and Öztürk v Germany,98 the ECHR held that 
for protection under the Convention, the formal classification made by national law is not 
decisive. Instead, the applicability of the guarantees under Article 6 should depend on the 
nature of the offence itself and the nature and severity of the sanction which can be 
imposed. 
When it comes to the relevance of administrative sanctions in a legal system one must not 
forget that they are in some countries the only possibility to sanction legal persons. While 
corporate criminal liability is well developed in countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, 
the UK and Ireland, countries like Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Austria and Germany still 
lack criminal liability for corporations.99 The adherence to the maxim “societas delinquere 
non potest” is for example justified by the fact that legal entities cannot be morally 
blameworthy and cannot be imprisoned.100     
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning, that imprisonment is generally excluded from the 
range of measures that can be imposed as administrative sanctions.101 
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4.2 Administrative Sanctions in the Community`s Legal System 
4.2.1 General Remarks on Sanctions in the Community  
As seen above, neither criminal law nor criminal procedure fall within the Community`s 
competence. However, this does not mean that the Community has to do without the 
application of sanctions in the case of breaches of Community rules. In fact, the 
Community is like any other legal system dependent on the possibility to impose sanctions 
to enforce its legal order.102 
Accordingly, administrative sanctions have been established in various fields of the 
Community legal order, like for example in competition law, merger control, transport, 
agriculture and fisheries. Administrative sanctions are by now a well developed means of 
enforcement of Community law, but there has been a lot of debate about the Community`s 
power to establish these sanctions. Since the legal basis differs according to the 
Community policy in question, a closer look on the exact legal basis for Community 
sanctions will be taken when dealing with the different sanctions in the respective area. 
This essay will examine in greater detail the Community sanctions in the fields of 
competition law and agriculture. 
Administrative proceedings in the Community can be structured in different ways. In 
certain areas, such as competition law and state subsidies, the administration is handled 
exclusively by the Community itself. For example, in competition law the Community has 
the power to carry out inspections by its own agents. This type of administration is within 
the Community legal order known as “direct administration.”103 In other areas, like for 
example agriculture, the Community institutions act as supervisors only, while the 
implementation of measures is the task of national authorities. This form of administration 
is what is known as “indirect administration.”104 In between these two models, there are 
various forms of administrative cooperation between Community institutions and national 
authorities; however, further examination of these would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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With regard to administrative sanctions, direct administration means, that Community 
institutions impose a sanction themselves, after having examined the individual case in an 
administrative procedure. 105 In this procedure, the right to be heard must be granted,106 and 
it is up to the courts of the Community107 to review the decision of the Community 
institution in question. The national courts are not at all involved in the whole process. 
In areas where the Community cannot act directly, it can instead include provisions in its 
legal acts providing for specific sanctions in case of breaches against these acts. These 
sanctions are then via indirect administration imposed by national authorities or courts,108 
without the involvement of any Community authority. Hence, the actors in the system of 
indirect administration are the Community legislator and the national administrations.109 
Judicial review lies with the national courts, which cooperate with the ECJ through the 
instrument of preliminary rulings. The implementation of Community law by the Member 
States is the general rule, direct administration is only applied if Community provisions 
expressly provide for it.110 
The application of Community sanctions, exactly like the application of national sanctions, 
raises the question if, and to which extent fundamental principles and criminal law 
guarantees have to be considered. As seen above, the ECHR ruled, that the application of 
fundamental freedoms and rights as laid down in Article 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights cannot depend on the formal classifications of a measure. However, the 
Community has not ratified the Convention, which means that it is not directly applicable 
to Community law.111 Still, Article 6 of the EU Treaty states that the Union “shall respect 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
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Rights” and consequently the provisions of the Convention are seen as a special tool for the 
interpretation and as leading principles for the rights and guarantees under Community 
law.112  
In 1995, the Council adopted a regulation on the protection of the European Communities 
financial interests,113 which serves as a general framework for investigating and repressing 
acts and omissions that by violating Community rules, cause financial harm to the 
Community, or could do so.114 The regulation provides for fundamental criminal law 
guarantees to be applied to Community sanctions with a punitive character. Inter alia, the 
regulation states that the rule of law (“nulla poena sine lege”) has to be applied and it 
stipulates the requirement of guilt (“nulla poena sine culpa”). The ECJ has for quite a long 
period been rather reluctant to apply criminal law guarantees to Community sanctions,115 
but in its recent case law it affirmed the applicability of the aforementioned principles, as 
well as the acknowledgment of reasons for justification and exculpation.116 
The establishment of Community sanctions is appreciated, because they are governed by 
one legal order, which is of course Community law, and they are of the same legal nature in 
all Member States. This is assumed to promote an equal and effective protection of EC law 
everywhere in the Community.117  
 
4.2.2 Community Sanctions in Competition Law 
The most prominent sanction system in the Community was established in the area of 
competition law. The competition law in the Community is built on two substantive 
provisions of the EC Treaty: Article 81 EC prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted 
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practices which may distort competition in the Community and declares any such 
agreement or decision as automatically void. Article 82 EC prohibits any abuse of a 
dominant position within the common market. Both provisions imply that the distortion 
may affect trade between Member States. 
Article 83 EC expressly enables the Community to adopt provisions, which shall be 
designed “to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 81(1) and in 
Article 82 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments.” 
In order to achieve the EC Treaty`s aim of a common market,118 it was already in the early 
years of the Community considered essential to “establish a system ensuring that 
competition shall not be distorted in the common market.”119 Based on the authority in 
Article 83 EC (former Article 87), Article 15 of the (by now disestablished) Regulation 
17/62120 empowered the Commission in case of a breach against Art. 81 or Art. 82 EC, to 
impose sanctions in the range of 1000 to 1 million Euro121, or up to 10% of the 
undertaking`s total turnover. Moreover, it was expressly stated in Article 15 of Regulation 
17/62, that sanctions imposed under this article should “not be of a criminal law nature.” 
The subsequent and presently valid Regulation 1/2003122 did not bring any substantive 
changes to these provisions. In Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, the range of fines in 
Regulation 17 for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC was adopted, as well as the 
express legal qualification of sanctions under this article as “not criminal.”  
According to this designation of the legal nature of these sanctions, the early case law of 
the Court insinuated that the sanctions provided for by Article 15 of Regulation 17 did not 
have a punitive character.123 Correspondingly, the fines imposed in these early years of the 
Community were rather low.124 This practice changed considerably with the Pioneer case125 
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in 1979, which saw a substantial increase in the level of fines. The Commission imposed 
what was described as an “exemplary fine” on one of the undertakings involved and the 
decision was said to “startle the business world.”126 The ECJ expressly permitted that the 
Commission raised the fines for the reason of deterrence.127 From that time on, a clear 
Commission policy to impose high fines to deter serious violations of Articles 81 and 82 
has emerged.128 A recent decision of the Commission129 to fine Microsoft for not 
complying with an anti-trust decision constitutes a new peak in this development. 
Microsoft was ordered to pay 899 million Euro, which makes the largest fine the EC has 
ever imposed on a single company. 
In determining the level of the fines, the Commission first has to consider the basic criteria 
stated by Regulation 1/2003: intent or negligence, and the nature and gravity of the 
infringement.130 In addition, the Commission has developed a system of aggravation and 
mitigation of fines related to its policy of deterrence through the imposition of fines.131 It 
should be mentioned, that the fines are not intended to compensate for the damage done by 
the infringing party or parties.132 
In the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the amount of the fines 
imposed by the Commission in competition law procedures and the deterrent purpose of 
these fines, raise the question to which extent the legal classification of the sanctions as  
“not criminal” in Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 can be decisive. This question is widely 
discussed by legal scholars and commentators in the Community; however this discussion 
has to date no factual influence on the legal nature of these sanctions. For the purpose of 
this essay it is therefore sufficient to establish that the fines imposed under the competition 
law sanctions regime are in fact administrative sanctions. 
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Another important aspect of the sanctions system in EC competition law is, that it is the 
model example for the concept of “direct administration” as described above. The 
Commission acts as the executive authority and is in charge both of the administrative 
procedure and the imposition of fines. Legal review of its decisions lies with the Court of 
Justice.133 In the course of establishment, if an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 EC has 
occurred, the Commission has fairly wide powers of investigation and inspection, such as 
their famous “dawn raids.”134 
 
4.2.3 Community Sanctions in the Field of Agriculture 
Since the eighties, regulations of the Community in the field of agriculture contain 
sanctioning provisions.135 The sanctions comprise measures such as the forfeiture of 
deposits, the withdrawal of a licence, the exclusion from subsidies for the future or 
surcharges up to 40% on amounts wrongly received and having to be repaid.136 By and by, 
the regulatory activity in this field increased; while the Commission e.g. in 1989 adopted 
18 acts providing for sanctions in the field of agriculture, this figure already in 1990 rose to 
42 acts. 
The introduction of sanctions in this area was regarded as necessary to prevent fraud and 
other infringements to the detriment of the financial interests of the Community.137 The 
Commission moreover complained about insufficiency of national enforcement measures, 
and unfounded differences between implementing provisions in the Member States.138 
 
Due to the absence of Community provisions stating otherwise, the administrative 
procedures and imposition of sanctions in this area lie with national authorities in the 
Member States (see above: indirect administration). 
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In the first years after these sanctions were adopted, the Community`s competence to 
actually adopt sanctions in the agricultural sector, as well as their legal basis and the 
principles applicable to them were unclear and controversial. For some time, the Court only 
ruled on the legitimacy of such sanctions in individual cases, without making a general 
statement.139  However, in 1992 the Court issued a landmark decision on these questions in 
the case Germany v Commission (Sheep Meat).140 The judgment recognizes the 
“Community`s power to impose penalties necessary for the effective application of the 
rules in the sphere of the common agricultural policy.”141 
  
When it comes to the legal basis of sanctions in the field of agriculture, there is no 
provision in the EC Treaty itself providing for such sanctions. 
Yet, Article 229 EC (former Art. 172 EC) states: “Regulations adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council, and by the Council, pursuant to the provisions of this 
Treaty, may give the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties 
provided for in such regulations.” This formulation has caused a controversy in legal 
theory: According to the strict doctrine, it is supposed to refer exclusively to competition 
law, as the only field, where the possibility to impose sanctions is expressly mentioned in 
the EC Treaty.142  In contrast to this opinion, the supporters of a broader interpretation 
assume that Art. 229 EC implies a general competence to impose sanctions.143   
However, this discussion has no effect on the legal basis for sanctions in the field of 
agriculture, since the Court found in Sheep Meat that “Article 172 (now Art. 229 EC) 
concerns only penalties fixed and imposed directly by the Community institutions”144 and 
consequently denied applicability of this provision to the agricultural sector. 
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Yet, even in the absence of express provisions in the EC Treaty, the Court`s case-law 
seems to be based on the assumption of a general competence of the Community to impose 
sanctions, as Advocate General Jacobs showed in his opinion in Sheep Meat.145 The Court 
consequently found in its judgment in Sheep Meat, that the Community has the “power to 
impose penalties necessary for the effective application of the rules in the sphere of the 
common agricultural policy” and that this power “is based on [the former] Article 40(3) 
and Article 43(2) EC.”146 (The former) Articles 40(3) and 43(2) EC enabled the 
Community to adopt “all measures required” for the implementation of a common 
agricultural policy. By this formulation, the Court made clear that the competence of the 
Community to provide for sanctions in the agricultural sector comes as an annex to the 
competences in this field.147  
The Court further, stated that the “sole condition” imposed by Articles 40(3) and 43(2) EC 
in order for a measure to come within the powers of the Community is, that “the measures 
contemplated should be necessary to attain the objectives of the common agricultural 
policy.”148 This formulation leaves a considerable discretion with the Community legislator 
as to the question, if a measure is necessary for an effective application of the Community 
rules.  
 
Furthermore, as regards content of the power to impose sanctions, the ECJ did not provide 
any clear guidelines. The Community legislator was therefore also rewarded a wide 
discretion regarding the choice of the applicable sanctions. In addition, the Court affirmed 
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the possibility to adopt sanctions, which are to be imposed by authorities of the Member 
States.149  
 
When it comes to the application of criminal law guarantees to sanctions in the agricultural 
sector, the 1995 Regulation to protect the European Communities financial interests150 
gives some guidance. The preamble of the regulation classifies Community measures in 
this sector as punitive sanctions, and the regulation stipulates the applicability of general 
principles, like the principle of legality and the “nulla poena sine culpa”-principle. 
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4.3 Analogy to the Introduction of Administrative Penalties in the Combat against 
Ship-Source Pollution 
4.3.1 Analogy to Administrative Sanctions in Competition Law 
Considering the introduction of administrative penalties in a policy of the Community, it 
seems to suggest itself to draw on the sanction system in competition law as comparison. 
This is first of all due to the fact, that the sanction system in competition law is well 
established and very well known in the Community. The procedures are observed by the 
public and receive a lot of attention in the media. 
Unfortunately, there is one big obstacle to a direct comparison of the sanction system in 
competition law to other policies in the Community: Competition law is the only field in 
the EC Treaty where the possibility to impose sanctions is expressly mentioned. Apart from 
Article 83 EC in competition law, the only article mentioning sanctions in the EC Treaty is 
Article 229 EC. Irrespective of the question, if Article 229 EC implies a general 
Community competence to impose sanctions,151 it by now means confers a competence to 
impose sanctions linked to a special policy like Article 83 EC. Hence, the conferment of 
the Community competence to impose sanctions in competition law is singular in its form.    
However, apart from the legal basis, several features of the sanction system in competition 
law can be drawn on, thinking about the possibility of administrative sanctions in the 
combat against ship-source pollution. 
As seen above, infringement procedures in Community competition law are characterized 
by the imposition of high fines. The Court has in its case law on competition matters 
clearly shown, that the capacity of an administrative penalty to constitute a valid deterrent 
against infringements justifies the existence of particularly high penalties.152 Moreover, the 
deterrent nature of fines imposed in competition matters is increased by the high publicity 
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of such procedures.153 Mostly, the accused in such procedures are big undertakings, which 
can be heavily affected by damage to their “good reputation” in the business world. 
There is no reason, why an analogical deterrent effect should not be created in the field of 
maritime transport through the imposition of high administrative fines. Like in competition 
matters, it is also in maritime safety mostly corporations that profit from infringements.154 
Therefore, even the range of fines applied in competition matters could give some guidance 
as to appropriate fines in maritime transport. Moreover, in maritime transport, the 
systematic use of publicity could even be more effective: Being publicly accused as a 
“reckless” polluter of the seas probably has an even stronger negative effect on an 
undertaking`s reputation, than “only” being accused of a breach of competition rules.155 
As explained above, competition law constitutes one of the areas in Community law where 
the exception of direct administration is applied. The sole competence of Community 
institutions brings about advantages in the implementation of Community rules. There is no 
risk that Member States fail to implement Community provisions or that there are 
differences in enforcement and sanctions actually imposed in the Member States.156 
However, the application of direct administration in the field of maritime safety would 
bring about a heavy workload for the Commission. Thinking about the fact that the 
notification system in Competition law was changed in 2004 to reduce the Commission`s 
workload, the introduction of direct administration in maritime transport does not seem 
likely. 
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4.3.2 Analogy to Administrative Sanctions in the Field of Agriculture 
As seen above, administrative sanctions in the field of agriculture exist in the Community 
legal order since the eighties, although there is no express legal basis for them in the EC 
Treaty. However, the Court in its landmark decision in Sheep Meat based the Community`s 
competence to provide for sanctions in this field on (the former) Articles 40(3) and 43(2) 
EC. Articles 40(3) and 43(2) empowered the Community to take actions which “may 
include all measures required to attain the objectives” of the common agricultural policy.      
Measures dealing with maritime safety can be described as having a twofold objective: 
They aim at the regulation of maritime transport as well as at the protection of the 
environment. They can therefore be said to be located at an interface between Title V EC, 
regulating the common transport policy of the Communities, and Title XIX EC on the 
environment. Therefore, measures in maritime safety could theoretically have their legal 
basis in both Community policies. 
Concerning the combat against ship-source pollution, Directive 2005/35/EC “on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including criminal sanctions for 
polluting offences”, was based on the Community policy in transport, more precisely on 
Article 80(2) EC. Also the Proposal for an amending Directive 2005/35/EC157 is based on 
Art. 80(2) EC. The Commission explains this choice of a legal basis by simply stating that 
“The provisions of this Directive relate to maritime transport. Consequently, the legal base 
chosen is Article 80(2) of the EC Treaty.”158 However, the Preamble of Directive 
2005/35/EC starts with the words: “The Community's maritime safety policy is aimed at a 
high level of safety and environmental protection[...].”159 This formulation shows, that the 
Directive first of all aims at the protection of the environment. Advocate General Mazak 
pointed out in this regard, that ”the fact that a Community measure pursues aims of 
                                                 
157
 COM(2008) 134 final. 
158
 Ibid.  
159
 OJ 2005 L 255, page 11. 
 42
environmental protection does not automatically mean that it has to be adopted on the basis 
of Art.175 EC.”160 In reverse, it could in theory also have been based on Art. 175 EC.      
 
It therefore makes sense to take a closer look at the enabling norms in both fields: The 
enabling norm concerning maritime transport is Article 80(2) EC, which reads: “The 
Council may,[...], decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate 
provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport.” 
 In environmental matters, the relevant norm is Art. 175 EC, which states: ”The Council, 
[…] shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community in order to achieve the 
objectives referred to in Article 174.“ 
Both provisions give a wide discretion to the Council in deciding, which measures should 
be adopted to achieve the aims of the Treaty. There is no instruction as to the content of the 
measures that should be adopted. The Council is therefore only limited by the general 
principles of Community law, like e.g. the subsidiarity and proportionality principle. The 
structure of these norms corresponds to (the former) Art. 40(3) and 43 (2) EC, on which the 
Court based the Community`s sanctioning competence in the agricultural sector as an 
annex to the competences in this field. Based on the wording of Articles 80(2) and 175 EC 
and the “effet utile” principle, there appears to be no reason, why the Court`s reasoning in 
the agricultural sector should not be conferrable to the Community policies of transport and 
environment.   
  
Another aspect of Community sanctions in the agricultural sector is their diversity. As set 
out above, the Community regulations in this field provide for quite a wide variety of 
different penalties. Also concerning environmental infringements, sanctions other than 
fines or imprisonment seem to be effective. At least, various Member States of the 
Community increasingly make use of so-called complementary sanctions in environmental 
matters.161 These measures contain e.g. the restoration of harm done to the environment, 
the removal of illegal gains, the “black-listing” of offenders or the future refusal of a 
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licence.162 As these complementary sanctions seem to prove effective both on Member 
State and Community level, it seems advisable to also introduce them on a Community 
level in order to protect the environment. At least, the enabling norms in the Community 
policies of transport and environment do not prevent this, as there are no limitations as to 
the content of measures adopted under these norms.  
 
Community sanctions in the agricultural sector are imposed by national authorities in the 
Member States. Also in environmental matters, many norms were adopted on Community 
level, but enforcement mechanisms were traditionally left with the Member States.163 
Considering the expertise of national administrative authorities and the workload which the 
Commission would have to handle in case of a change to the system, indirect 
administration seems most appropriate for sanctions in the fields of transport and 
environment. 
 
4.4 Discussion of the Introduction of Administrative Sanctions in the Field of 
Maritime Safety Instead of Criminal Sanctions 
4.4.1 The Question of Effectiveness 
In the proposal for an amending Directive 2005/35/EC, the Commission states that criminal 
law related measures “are necessary to ensure that the Community`s rules on maritime 
safety will be fully effective.”164 To justify this assumption, the Commission gives the 
following reasoning: 
“[...] the deterrent effect of the [present] system of sanctions must be reinforced, sending a 
strong signal, with a much greater dissuasive effect, to potential offenders. Common rules 
on criminal offences make it possible to use effective methods of judicial cooperation 
between Member States. Criminal investigation and prosecution can be more powerful than 
administrative action.”165 
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This reasoning largely corresponds to former statements of the Commission, as e.g. given 
in a proposal for a directive “on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law“166 presented by the Commission on 13 March 2001. The Commission held: 
 
In many cases, only criminal penalties will provide a sufficiently dissuasive effect. First, 
the imposition of criminal sanctions demonstrates a social disapproval of a qualitatively 
different nature compared to administrative sanctions or a compensation mechanism under 
civil law. It sends a strong signal, with a much greater dissuasive effect, to offenders. [...] 
Second, the means of criminal prosecution and investigation (and assistance between 
Member States) are more powerful than tools of administrative or civil law and can 
enhance effectiveness of investigations. Furthermore, there is an additional guarantee of 
impartiality of investigating authorities, because other authorities than those administrative 
authorities that have granted exploitation licences or authorisations to pollute will be 
involved in a criminal investigation. 
 
In both statements, the Commission basically gives two arguments justifying the 
introduction of criminal penalties. 
 
First, it attributes “a much greater dissuasive effect” to criminal sanctions than to other 
types of sanctions. While this “greater dissuasive effect” is not explained any further in the 
present proposal, the 2001 proposal at least points to “a social disapproval of a qualitatively 
different nature compared to administrative sanctions.”  It is of course true, that the “ethical 
dimension”167 of criminal law distinguishes criminal sanctions from other types of 
sanctions. However, it seems doubtful if this can be enough to make criminal law per se 
effective. At least, this “symbolic” character of criminal law can not serve as an objective 
criterion on which the principle of effectiveness can be based.168  
Besides, the dissuasive effect which is created by the high publicity and high fines in 
competition law procedures should not be overlooked. In light of fines and public attention 
as in the recent Microsoft case169, it is doubtable whether the mere fact that a sanction is 
criminal really creates such a “greater dissuasive effect.” 
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The second argument of the Commission for the introduction of criminal penalties, is that it 
considers criminal investigation and prosecution to be more powerful than administrative 
action. In addition, it considers criminal procedures as a guarantee for impartiality of 
investigating authorities, because other authorities than those administrative authorities that 
have granted exploitation licences or authorisations to pollute will be involved in a criminal 
investigation. Regarding the latter, the Commission ignores the fact, that in most Member 
States not the administrative authorities granting a licence or giving an authorisation will be 
involved in subsequent investigation procedures, but different authorities.170 As to the 
assumption, that criminal investigation is per se more powerful than administrative action it 
should be noted, that environmental law enforcement requires a great deal of expertise. In 
this area, administrative authorities often have more technical knowledge and information 
than traditional law enforcement authorities.171 So, in addition to the limited capacity of 
police forces in most Member States, they mostly also lack this expertise. Moreover, the 
introduction of criminal sanctions in implementing legislation does not guarantee the 
effective application of these sanctions in question. In most Member States, the so-called 
opportunity principle is still valid and there is no duty to actually prosecute.172 
 
Furthermore, administrative sanctions can be more differentiated than criminal penalties - 
the widespread use of complementary sanctions in the Member States is a sign, that these 
sanctions are suitable in the protection of the environment. The introduction of criminal 
penalties could therefore deprive legal systems of their flexibility in environmental matters. 
 
4.4.2 Culpability of Legal Persons 
Against the background of the Commission`s view that criminal law is a “necessary 
instrument in the fight for an effective enforcement of the rules on maritime safety”, the 
status of legal persons becomes quite an interesting question. The proposal for an amending 
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Directive 2005/35/EC173 stipulates that offences under the Directive should be punishable 
by “effective proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which have to be of a criminal nature 
for legal persons. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties should also be applied 
to legal persons if they are considered liable [...]”. However, the proposed Directive “leaves 
the Member States the choice of whether criminal penalties should also apply to legal 
persons.” This is due to the fact, that not all Member States know the concept of corporate 
criminal liability.174 In order to prevent, that these States have to make changes in their 
national criminal law systems, the Directive leaves the criminal liability of legal persons to 
the Member States.175 
There is a remarkable repugnance in the Commission`s reasoning when it comes to the role 
of legal persons in the area of maritime safety. On one side, the Commission states that 
“only criminal penalties will provide a sufficiently dissuasive effect.”176 On the other side, 
it considers non-criminal sanctions for legal persons sufficient, as long as they are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.177    
This shows that the Commission at least recognizes the possibility of effective non-
criminal sanctions in maritime safety, even if it would prefer criminal sanctions. Most 
environmental crimes are committed by natural persons for the benefit of corporations.178 
The shipping industry is of course no exception to this.  It is therefore obvious, that if 
sanction rules in maritime safety are supposed to be effective, one must put emphasis on 
the role of legal persons. 
Unfortunately, the Commission with its focus on criminal law ignores the possibility to 
create by itself an effective sanction system for legal persons in maritime safety. In the 
current situation it is left with the Member States, if they want to sanction legal persons by 
criminal or non-criminal sanctions. Moreover, if they choose to apply non-criminal 
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sanctions, they are completely free regarding the type and level of these sanctions. This can 
leave to considerably differences in the sanctioning of legal persons for infringements 
under the Directive 2005/35/EC. There is no guarantee at all, that no “safe heavens” for 
legal persons committing offences under the Directive will be provided. If the Community 
instead introduced the same administrative measures or a certain level of fines for 
infringements in all Member States, it would send a much stronger signal to legal persons 
involved in the shipping industry. 
 
4.4.3 The International Character of the Shipping Industry – Distortion of 
Competition       
As seen above, the competition rules of the Community aim at avoiding distortion of 
competition as much as possible in order to create a common market. The rationale is, that 
if equal conditions of competition are achieved in the Member States, the market will do 
the rest to establish the common market.179 Disparities in sanction levels constitute an 
objective difference in the conditions of competition between Member States. However, 
regarding sanction rules, it is very unlikely that the free play of market forces will lead to 
desirable results. As Member States normally do not want to place their own companies at 
disadvantage, they rather prefer to be too lenient than being too strict.180 
 
The shipping industry is like no other industry characterised by its cross-border dimension. 
Different conditions regarding the shipping industry`s activities in the Member States are 
therefore very likely to have an immediate impact on competition. Especially in such an 
international industry, uneven enforcement of Community rules can easily lead to tensions 
and erosion of public confidence in the system.181 Moreover, Member States could 
consciously keep their sanction levels low to profit from the so-called “Delaware Effect.” 
The “Delaware effect” describes a situation in which sanction levels in different states vary 
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to such an extent, that it influences the decision of companies where to establish business 
or whether to transfer certain activities to another State. 182 By the adoption of a 
Community legal act providing for the same administrative sanctions throughout the 
Community, distortion of competition could be avoided. 
 
4.4.4 Choice of Instruments  
The proposal for an amending Directive 2005/35/EC states that the existing Directive 
2005/35/EC must be brought in line with the Court ruling in Case C-440/05 (the Marine 
Pollution case).183 According to the proposal, a directive can only be amended by an 
amending directive. 
Independent from this rule regarding amendments, there is no reason why a directive 
should not be supplemented by a regulation. Articles 80(2) and 175 EC enable the 
Community to adopt regulations both in the field of maritime transport and environment. 
Even if environmental law in the Community has traditionally been in the form of 
Directives, there is no rule restricting Community environmental law to one legal 
instrument only. In theory, both a directive and a regulation providing for administrative 
sanctions in the field of maritime safety could be based on either Art. 80(2) or Art. 175 EC.    
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5 Conclusion 
By adopting Directive 2005/35/EC and Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA, the 
Community first and foremost aimed at the protection of the seas against pollution by 
irresponsible actors of the shipping industry. Moreover, the Community aimed at 
implementing the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), which stipulates in Article 4(4) that penalties have to be “adequate in severity 
to discourage” potential polluters. 
The Community decided that criminal penalties constitute a necessary tool to ensure an 
effective enforcement of the rules on maritime safety. The annulment of Framework 
Decision 2005/667/JHA tore a hole in the European legislative package designed to 
achieve an equal protection of the marine environment all over the Community. 
Concerning the question whether the judgment in Marine Pollution rather weakened or 
strengthened the fight against pollution of the seas, no definite answer can be provided at 
this point of time. On one hand, the Community was awarded the authority to instruct the 
Member States to introduce criminal penalties for polluting acts, which means that it can 
also enforce this instruction with its full powers under the supranational first pillar. On the 
other hand, it is by no means granted that the Community will reach the qualified majority 
in the Council to adopt such a legislative act. And even more important, the judgment led 
to a loss of the provisions providing for an approximation of sanction levels for polluting 
acts in the Member States.   
In the course of its efforts to fill this “legal vacuum created concerning a harmonised 
approach regarding possible penalties in the fight against maritime pollution”184 the 
Commission decided in favour of a partial solution: It adopted a proposal for an amending 
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Directive 2005/35/EC based on Article 80(2) EC, which contains an obligation of the 
Member States to regard infringements under the Directive as criminal offences. However, 
the types and levels of penalties to be adopted in order to sanction these offences are left 
with the Member States.  
This approach is logical from the Commission`s viewpoint. As it is determined to stick 
with the criminal law in order to combat pollution, it fully utilises the Community`s 
competences in this sphere as set out by the Court in Marine Pollution. And since the Court 
ruled, that the Community is not competent to decide on type and level of criminal 
sanctions, the Commission intends to leave the decision on sanctions with the Member 
States.  
Moreover, the requirement to sanction infringements under Directive 2005/35/EC by 
criminal penalties does not include legal persons. So, regarding the most important actors 
in the shipping industry there are no clear instructions at all regarding sanctions, apart from 
the rather abstract stipulation that they be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 
Considering the different attitudes of the Member States on maritime safety rules, it is very 
likely that sanction levels, and concerning legal persons even the legal nature of sanctions, 
will differ considerably in the Community. Like this, the Community`s aim of prevention 
of “safe heavens” for offenders can not be guaranteed, and due to the international 
character of the shipping industry, differences in sanction levels are very likely to distort 
competition.  
 
However, the Court`s ruling, that the Community must not decide on type and level of 
sanctions only refers to criminal sanctions. When it comes to administrative sanctions on 
the contrary, the Community is free to regulate on both of these aspects. 
Administrative penalties have proved to be an effective means of enforcement of 
Community law, especially in the field of competition law and in the agricultural sector. By 
the imposition of high fines and the use of publicity, administrative sanctions in 
competition law have reached a strong deterrent effect. Community sanctions in the 
agricultural sector stand out by a broad diversity of sanctions, which allows an appropriate 
answer to the respective breach of Community law. As could be seen, many of the features 
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of these sanction systems could be transferred to the field of maritime safety. The 
Community could utilise its experience with administrative penalties in competition law 
and the agricultural sector to promote the enforcement of Community rules on maritime 
safety. 
 
It may be true, that criminal law generally constitutes the fiercest means of legal systems to 
prevent certain forms of behaviour. However, this does not mean, that criminal law has to 
be the most effective means in any situation. Concerning ship-source pollution, a consistent 
system of administrative sanctions at Community level would certainly send a much 
stronger signal to potential offenders. All actors in the shipping industry would know that 
polluting offences result in the same consequences all over the Community. In addition, no 
Member State would be able to make itself more attractive to the shipping industry by 
applying more lenient rules than others. 
If the Community really wants to ensure that penalties are “adequate in severity to 
discourage” potential polluters as stipulated by MARPOL, it should abandon its approach, 
that only criminal law can be truly effective to prevent ship-source pollution. It should 
rather adopt a legislative act providing for administrative sanctions on Community level, 
entailing penalties of sufficient severity to have a deterrent effect on the shipping industry.     
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